Legal updates and opinions
News / News
Don’t be intimidated into relying on a SARS interpretation note
The SARS states, on its website (www.sars.gov.za), that its “Interpretation Notes are intended to provide guidelines to stakeholders (both internal and external) on the interpretation and application of the provisions of the legislation administered by the Commissioner”.
However, this statement was brought into question by the Constitutional Court last year, in application for leave to appeal to that court in Marshall NO v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service. While the application for leave to appeal was refused due to the applicant’s poor prospects of success, the court decided to give its views on the reliance on the Interpretation Notes by courts when interpreting the tax legislation.
In this case, the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal were required to interpret provisions of the VAT Act. The Supreme Court of Appeal, in its judgment regarded Interpretation Note 39 as a persuasive, although non-binding, explanation of the meaning and application of the relevant provisions of the VAT Act.
In a short judgment, the Constitutional Court gave its view on the issue as follows:
“Missing from this reformulation is any explicit mention of the further fundamental contextual change, that from legislative supremacy to constitutional democracy. Why should a unilateral practise of one part of the executive arm of government play a role in the determination of the reasonable meaning to be given to a statutory provision? It might conceivably be justified, where the practice is evidence of an impartial application of a custom recognised by all concerned, but not where the practice is unilaterally established by one of the litigating parties. In those circumstances, it is difficult to see what advantage evidence of the unilateral practice will have for the objective and independent interpretation by the courts of the meaning of legislation, in accordance with constitutionally compliant precepts. It is best avoided.”
In our view, this clarification of the status of Interpretation Notes by the Constitutional Court is to be welcomed. However, this does not mean that Interpretation Notes have no significance.
In terms of section 5(1) of the Tax Administration Act, a “practice generally prevailing” is “… a practice set out in an official publication regarding the application or interpretation of a Tax Act”. An “official publication” is defined in section 1 of the Tax Administration Act to specifically include an Interpretation Note. The significance of this, is that if one is assessed in accordance with a practice generally prevailing, the SARS cannot subsequently change its mind and assess the taxpayer differently. Similarly, if there is no assessment by the SARS, e.g. for PAYE or VAT, if the taxpayer calculated its tax liability in accordance with the practice generally prevailing, the SARS cannot assess the taxpayer differently.
In conclusion, taxpayers are free to use an Interpretation Note as guidance, and even to rely on its provisions in support of a tax position taken. But equally, taxpayers are free to disagree with what is stated in the Interpretation Note and are in no way bound by its contents.
Latest News
The Balancing Act: The Sharing of Company Information by Exiting Shareholders with Potential Third-Party Purchasers
and Emma Reid, Candidate Attorney INTRODUCTION The default position regarding who can access a company's records and information ("company information") [...]
Court Orders Gauteng Department of Health to Provide Cancer Treatment to Patients Awaiting Care
and Slade van Rooyen - Candidate Attorney and Farah Yassin - Candidate Attorney On 27 March 2025, the Gauteng Local [...]
Allegations of Ethnic Discrimination Require Evidence: the Sagan Principle
and Isabella Keeves - Candidate Attorney In 1979 science communicator and physicist Carl Sagan wrote in his book Broca's Brain [...]
The Clock Is Ticking: Labour Disputes and the Perils of Miscalculating Timeframes
The recent Labour Court decision in Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality v SAMWU obo Bukula and Others (PR174/2023) provides a sobering [...]
Automatic Termination Clauses Do Not Trump the LRA: The Biyana Case
and Isabella Keeves – Candidate Attorney The CCMA’s recent decision in Biyana v National Consumer Commission (2025) 34 CCMA 7.17.2 [...]
FICA: Proposed changes to Public Compliance Communication 50 and Directive 3 previously issued by the Financial Intelligence Centre
by Sandiso Dhlomo, Associate and Nhlonipho Mthembu, Candidate Attorney reviewed by Tracy Lee Janse van Rensburg On 14 March 2025, [...]