

# Risk Mitigation for Boards of **Directors**

What directors need to know about their responsibilities, duties and potential for personal liability as set out in the Companies Act 71 of 2008.

# Table of contents

Introduction	03
Background to the King V Report	04
Who is a “Director”?	06
How are directors appointed in terms of the Companies Act?	06
How are directors removed in terms of the Companies Act?	07
The quorum for (and voting at) a directors’ meeting	08
Board committees	08
What are the duties of directors in terms of the Companies Act?	09
Section 75	09
Section 76	10
Personal liability of directors to the company under the Companies Act	11
Personal liability of directors to third parties (such as creditors) under the Companies Act	13
Liability for reckless trading under section 424 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973	13
Delinquent and probationer directors – section 162 of the Companies Act	13
Directors’ duties when a company faces financial difficulties	16
What are the defences available to directors to escape personal liability?	17
Limitation of liability, indemnification and directors’ insurance	19
Lessons to be learnt	19
Meet the authors	21



## Introduction

Worldwide, the roles and duties of directors are coming into increased focus. This is because there is a need for proper and justifiable decisions to be made by boards for companies and their stakeholders at all times.

Given that the business and affairs of a company are managed under the direction of its board of directors, it comes as no surprise that significant responsibilities rest on directors' shoulders – a fact which cannot be ignored.

For this reason, where a board of directors, or its individual directors, do not comply with their legal duties and obligations, such directors may, at best, be severely criticised, and at worst, be held personally liable for losses sustained by the company and/or its creditors.

The Companies Act 71 of 2008 ("Companies Act"), amongst other things, sets out the rules and procedures applicable to directors, **which include:**

- rules relating to the appointment of directors;
- grounds for ineligibility and disqualification of persons to be directors;
- removal of directors in certain circumstances;
- procedures relative to declaring directors delinquent;
- steps directors are required to take when a company
- faces financial distress; and
- directors' responsibilities, duties and liabilities.

The provisions of the Companies Act must be properly considered by directors. This is important for several reasons, including avoiding personal liability under the Companies Act.

Following the introduction of the King V Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa 2025 ("King V Report"), there has been an increased emphasis on ensuring that a company and its board have access to professional and independent advice not only in relation to corporate governance principles, but also in relation to the legal duties owed by directors to the company and its stakeholders. This underlines that the key to achieving ethical and effective corporate governance, is ensuring that the parties involved are fully aware of their legal obligations, duties and liabilities.

For this reason, we have prepared this booklet, in which we seek to provide some insight into certain of the responsibilities and duties of directors, in terms of the Companies Act, and with reference to the King V Report.

## Background to the King V Report

The King V Report is a voluntary code which sets out various principles and recommended practices that companies in South Africa, through their governance structures, should consider following. Corporate governance, for purposes of the King V Report, is defined as the exercise of ethical and effective leadership by governing bodies, towards the realisation of identified governance outcomes for the organisation within its economic, social and environmental context, namely: ethical culture, performance and value creation, conformance and prudent control, and legitimacy.

Although predecessors to the King V Report subscribed to a stakeholder-inclusive approach, the King V Report integrates sustainable value creation more comprehensively by embedding sustainability criteria directly in several of its 13 core principles. This, co-incidentally, also goes a long way towards addressing Environmental, Social and Governance (“ESG”) issues. The 13 principles are:



**Principle 1:** The governing body leads ethically and effectively as the focal point of corporate governance in the organisation.



**Principle 2:** The governing body governs the ethics of the organisation in a way that enables an ethical culture and responsible corporate citizenship.



**Principle 3:** The governing body ensures that the organisation's purpose, strategy and business model support performance that creates sustainable value within the organisation's economic, social and environmental context.



**Principle 4:** The governing body ensures that external reports issued by the organisation enable stakeholders to make informed assessments of how the organisation creates, preserves and erodes value within its economic, social and environmental context of the short, medium and long term.



**Principle 5:** The governing body ensures that its composition is balanced with respect to the mix of competencies, diversity and independence that enables it to discharge its obligations objectively and effectively.



**Principle 6:** The governing body ensures that arrangements for delegation to committees and individuals within its own structures promote the objective and effective discharge of its obligations.



**Principle 7:** The governing body ensures that the appointment and delegation to management promote operational effectiveness and that the respective roles and decision-making powers of the governing body and management are clearly defined.



**Principle 8:** The governing body governs risk in a way that enables the organisation to sustain and optimise its strategy and objectives.



**Principle 9:** The governing body governs compliance with applicable laws and adopted policies, non-binding rules, codes and standards in a way that promotes ethics and responsible corporate citizenship.



**Principle 10:** The governing body governs data, information and technology in a way that enables the organisation to sustain and optimise its strategy and objectives.



**Principle 11:** The governing body ensures that the organisation remunerates fairly, responsibly and transparently to promote sustainable value creation by the organisation within its economic, social and environmental context.



**Principle 12:** The governing body ensures that assurance functions and services promote an effective internal control environment and safeguard the integrity of external reports issued by the organisation.



**Principle 13:** The governing body adopts a stakeholder-inclusive approach in the execution of its duties in the long-term best interests of the organisation within its economic, social and environmental context.

The King V Report provides guidance in relation to the implementation of the aforesaid principles by listing recommended practices that describe in greater detail how each principle should be implemented. That is, application of these guiding practices should be adapted and varied where necessary, with the ultimate aim of adhering to the 13 principles in order to realise the intended governance outcomes.

This outcome-based approach, coupled with the “apply and explain” application regime encourages organisations to achieve objectives, rather than rigidly following a set of rules.

This approach affords organisations a degree of flexibility and recognises that each organisation operates in its own distinct and unique environment. The King V Report also introduced a standardised Disclosure Framework to ensure consistent and transparent reporting. The Disclosure Framework is a key part of the King V Report and any organisation that claims compliance with its principles must report in terms thereof. Organisations are now expressly required to state which recommended practices have not been implemented, justify this decision, and explain how the principle supported by the recommended practice in question is nonetheless given effect to.

The fact that the King V report is voluntary does not imply that directors can disregard its principles lightly. Listed companies must comply with specific principles and recommended practices that have been directly incorporated into the JSE Listings requirements and must comply with the rest of the King V Report on an apply and explain basis. Unlisted companies should however also give its principles serious consideration and adapt and scale them in ways that allow sensible implementation. This is not only to reap the accepted benefits of good corporate governance practices and diminish risks to the company, but also to safeguard directors against potential liability, given that the courts have in several cases made reference to previous King Reports when interpreting and applying the directors’ duties imposed by the Companies Act.

## Who is a “Director”?

The Companies Act defines a “director” as a member of the board of a company, as contemplated in section 66 of the Companies Act, or an alternate director, by whatever name designated. This definition is critical, as the title of a director carries with it a whole host of responsibilities, and the legal duty to manage the business and affairs of the company.

Section 66 of the Companies Act provides that the business and affairs of a company must be managed by or under the direction of its board of directors, which has the authority to exercise all of the powers and perform all of the functions of the company, except to the extent that the Companies Act or the company’s memorandum of incorporation (“**MOI**”) provide otherwise.

The definition of a “director” is expanded for the purpose of sections 75 to 77 of the Companies Act. Here, a “director” includes a prescribed officer, and a person who is a member of a committee of the board of a company - irrespective of whether that person is also a member of the company’s board. In terms of Companies Regulations 38, despite not being a director of a particular company, a person is considered to be a “prescribed officer” of the company for all purposes of the Companies Act if that person exercises general executive control over and management of the whole, or a significant portion, of the business and activities of the company, or regularly participates to a material degree in the exercise of general executive control over and management of the whole, or a significant portion, of the business and activities of the company. Examples of prescribed officers include, but are certainly not limited to chief executive officers, chief financial officers, general counsel and the like.

As such, simply not having the title “director” is by no means a blanket protection from the duties and obligations imposed by the Companies Act.

Furthermore, the Court in *Howard v Herrigel and Another NNO 1991 (2) SA 660 (A)*, held that there is no distinction between executive and non-executive directors when determining directors’ duties towards a company. Accordingly, non-executive directors are not exempt from the responsibilities, duties and liabilities of an executive director.

As such, any reference to “director” or “directors” below, includes prescribed officers and non-executive directors.

## How are directors appointed in terms of the Companies Act?

Section 66 of the Companies Act stipulates that:

- the board of a private or personal liability company must comprise of at least one director, in addition to the minimum number of directors that the company must have to satisfy any requirement to appoint an audit committee, or a social and ethics committee;
- the board of a public or non-profit company must comprise of at least three directors, in addition to the minimum number of directors that the company must have to satisfy any requirement to appoint an audit committee, or a social and ethics committee; and
- the company’s MOI may specify a higher minimum number of directors.

A company’s MOI may also:

- specifically authorise one or more named persons to appoint and remove one or more directors;
- provide for one or more persons to be ex officio directors of the company; and
- provide for the appointment or election of one or more persons as alternate directors of the company.

In the case of a profit company (other than a state owned company), the MOI must provide for the election by shareholders of at least 50% of the directors and 50% of any alternate directors.

The manner in which directors of a company are appointed is prescribed in section 68 of the Companies Act. This section stipulates that each director of a company must be elected by the persons entitled to exercise voting rights in such an election. Furthermore, each director should be elected to serve for an indefinite term or for a term as set out in the MOI of the company. In addition, and unless the MOI provides otherwise, the election of directors is to be conducted as a series of votes, each of which is on the candidacy of a single individual to fill a single vacancy, with the series of votes continuing until all vacancies on the board have been filled.

Each voting right entitled to be exercised may only be exercised once, and the vacancy may only be filled if a majority of the voting rights exercised, support the candidate. Section 68(3) allows the board, unless the MOI of the company provides otherwise, to appoint a person satisfying the requirements for election as a director to fill any vacancy and to serve as a director of the company on a temporary basis until the vacancy has been filled by election.

## How are directors removed in terms of the Companies Act?

Section 71 of the Companies Act, on the other hand, prescribes how directors may be removed. Section 71(1) provides that a director shall be removed by an ordinary resolution (more than 50% of the voting rights exercised on the resolution or such higher percentage as determined in the relevant MOI) adopted at a shareholders meeting by the persons entitled to exercise voting rights in an election of that director. However, prior to such resolution being passed, the director concerned must be given notice (at least equivalent to the time which a shareholder is entitled to receive such notice) of the meeting and the resolution, and the director must be afforded reasonable opportunity to make a presentation, in person or through a representative, to the meeting, before such resolution is put to a vote.

Section 71(3) of the Companies Act provides further that where a company has more than two directors and it is alleged that a director has:

- become ineligible or disqualified or incapacitated to the extent that he or she is unable to perform the functions of a director, and is unlikely to regain that capacity within a reasonable time; or
- neglected, or been derelict in the performance of or the functions of director,

then the board, other than the director concerned, must determine the matter by resolution and may remove a director deemed to be so ineligible or disqualified, incapacitated, negligent or derelict, as the case may be.

Before such resolution may be considered by the board, however, the director concerned must be given:

- notice of the meeting, including a copy of the proposed resolution and a statement setting out reasons for the resolution; and
- a reasonable opportunity to make a presentation, in person or through a representative, to the meeting before the resolution is put to a vote.

If the board determines that the director concerned is ineligible or disqualified, incapacitated, negligent or derelict, as the case may be, he or she, or a person who appointed such director, may apply within 20 business days to a court to review the determination of the board.

On the other hand, if it is determined by the board that the director concerned is not ineligible or disqualified, incapacitated, negligent or derelict, as the case may be, any director who voted otherwise on the resolution, or any holder of voting rights entitled to be exercised in the election of that director, may apply to a court to review the determination. The court may either confirm the determination of the board, or remove the director from office.

Section 71(3) of the Companies Act will not apply to a company with fewer than three directors. Any director or shareholder of such a company may apply to the Companies Tribunal to make a determination contemplated in section 71(3) of the Companies Act.

## The quorum for (and voting at) a directors' meeting

Section 73(1) of the Companies Act provides that a director who is authorised by the board may call a meeting at any time and that such person must call a meeting if required to do so by at least 25% of the directors (in the case of a board that has at least 12 members) or two directors in any other case.

The Companies Act provides further in section 73(5)(b) that a majority of the directors must be present at a meeting before a vote may be called at the meeting. However the company's MOI may set out a different quorum for meetings of the directors of the company.

In a similar manner, section 73(5) of the Companies Act provides that, unless the company's MOI provides otherwise, each director has one vote at any meeting of the board and board resolutions are passed by simple majority decisions.

## Board committees

Section 72 of the Companies Act entitles companies to appoint board committees and delegate to any committee any authority of the board.

Board committees are prescribed in terms of:

- section 72(4) of the Companies Act, as read with Companies Regulation 43, where every state owned company, publicly listed company, and companies with a Public Interest Score ("PIS") above 500 in any two of the preceding five years, are required to have a Social and Ethics Committee. Companies may, however, apply for exemption from having a Social and Ethics Committee to the Companies Tribunal, and subsidiaries of holding do companies that does have a Social and Ethics Committee are not required to have a committee; and
- section 94 of the Companies Act, a public company, state owned company or other company that is required by the Companies Act, the Companies Regulations or MOI to have its annual financial statements audited every year, must appoint an audit committee comprising at least three members, unless the company is a subsidiary of a holding company that does have an audit committee, and the audit committee of the holding company will perform the functions required under this section on behalf of that subsidiary company.

Such committees, and other board committees, may include people who are not directors of the company, but they may not be ineligible or disqualified to be a company director and may not vote on any matter to be decided by the committee. Board committees have the full authority of the board in respect of matters referred to them and may consult with or receive advice from any person. However, the creation of any committee and the delegation of any power do not by themselves satisfy or constitute compliance by a director with his or her duties as a director, as set out in Section 76.

# What are the duties of directors in terms of the Companies Act?

Before the promulgation of the Companies Act, the duties of company's directors were governed by common law. The common law dictates that directors must act in the utmost good faith and in the best interests of their companies, and includes the need to exercise care, skill and diligence so as to promote company success through independent judgement.

These common law duties and principles were examined by the court in the case of *Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Limited v. Jorgensen 1980 (4) SA 156 (W)*, where it was stated:

"The extent of a director's duty of care and skill depend to a considerable degree on the nature of the company's business and on any particular obligations assumed by or assigned to him. ... He is... expected to exercise the care which can reasonably be expected of a person with his knowledge and experience. ...Obviously, a director exercising reasonable care would not accept information and advice blindly. He would accept it, and he would be entitled to rely on it, but he would give it due consideration and exercise his own judgment in the light thereof. ...A director may not be indifferent or a mere dummy. Nor may he shelter behind culpable ignorance or failure to understand the company's affairs."

The Companies Act has codified the common law position and makes a few notable additions thereto. The Companies Act extends the duties of directors, and thus increases the accountability of directors to the shareholders and other stakeholders of the company.

However, common law duties and principles still apply where they have not been expressly altered by, or are not in conflict with, the Companies Act. Sections 75 and 76 of the Companies Act address, to a large extent, the standard of conduct expected from directors.

## Section 75

Section 75 primarily deals with conflicts of interest and requires the disclosure of directors' personal financial interests in respect of matters relating to the company. It provides that if a director of a company, save where limited exceptions apply, has a personal financial interest in respect of a matter to be considered at a meeting of the board, or knows that a related person has a personal financial interest in the matter, that director must:

- disclose the interest and its general nature before the matter is considered at the meeting;
- must disclose to the meeting any material information relating to the matter, and known to the director;
- may disclose any observations or pertinent insights relating to the matter if requested to do so by the other directors;
- if present at the meeting, must leave the meeting immediately after making any disclosure as contemplated above; and
- must not take part in the consideration of the matter, except to the extent contemplated in the above paragraphs.

## Section 76

Section 76 of the Companies Act, on the other hand, addresses the standard of conduct expected from directors and extends it beyond the common law duty of directors.

Section 76(3) of the Companies Act states that a director of a company, when acting in that capacity, must exercise the powers and perform the functions of a director:

- in good faith and for a proper purpose;
- in the best interests of the company; and
- with the degree of care, skill and diligence that may reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the same functions in relation to the company as carried out by that director, and having the general knowledge, skill and experience of that director.

Section 76(4) of the Companies Act states that in respect of any matter arising in the exercise of the powers or the performance of the functions of a director, a director will have satisfied the obligations in section 76(3) of the Companies Act, if the director:

- has taken reasonably diligent steps to become informed about the matter;
- has made a decision, or supported the decision of a committee or the board with regard to that matter; and
- had a rational basis for believing, and did believe, that the decision was in the best interests of the company.

The court explained the impact of section 76(4) in relation to the duty to act in the best interests of the company in *Visser Citrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Citrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC)* as follows:

*“Section 76(4) makes clear that the duty imposed by s 76(3)(b) to act in the best interests of the company is not an objective one, in the sense of entitling a court, if a board decision is challenged, to determine what is objectively speaking in the best interests of the company. What is required is that the directors, having taken reasonably diligent steps to become informed, should subjectively have believed that their decision was in the best interests of the company and this belief must have had ‘a rational basis’.”*

In further compliance with this section, the director is required to communicate to the board, at the earliest practicable opportunity, any material information that comes to his or her attention, unless he or she:

- reasonably believes that the information is publicly available or known to the other directors; or
- is bound by a legal or ethical obligation of confidentiality.

A director would therefore be entitled to rely (but not blindly) on the performance and information provided by others, including financial statements and other financial data prepared by the employees of the company, accountants or any other professional person retained by the company, the board, or any committee constituted by the company.

The skills or expertise of both the person providing the information and of the director considering the information are also relevant. For instance, if a director receives financial information, he or she would be entitled to rely on the veracity of such information, provided such reliance is reasonable in the circumstances, taking into account the skills and expertise of the person providing the information and what the director knows of the company's state of affairs. For example, a marketing director of the company would not necessarily have the same level of insight into a company's financial information as would the financial director.

Section 76 also provides that a director of a company must not use the position of director, or any information obtained while acting in the capacity of a director to gain an advantage for him/herself, or for another person (other than the company or a wholly-owned subsidiary of the company), or to knowingly cause harm to the company or a subsidiary of the company. This means that a director has the duty not to misappropriate corporate opportunities, to account for secret profits and not to improperly compete with the company or its subsidiaries.

## Personal liability of directors to the company under the Companies Act

Directors of companies can be held personally liable for any damages caused to the company where the directors have failed to apply and/or have satisfied the solvency and liquidity test in section 4 of the Companies Act, when contemplating:

- financial assistance for the acquisition or subscription of securities in the company;
- financial assistance provided to directors and/or to; certain related and inter-related parties;
- dividends and distributions;
- the issue of capitalisation shares;
- share buy backs; and
- amalgamations or mergers.

There are, in addition, other provisions within the Companies Act that allows for the directors of a company to incur personal liability. For instance, section 77(2) of the Companies Act provides that a director may be held personally liable to the company for any loss, damage or costs arising as a direct or indirect consequence of that director, amongst others:

- breaching a fiduciary duty, or any other duty contemplated in sections 75 and 76 or any other section of the Companies Act or the company's MOI; and
- being a party to an act or omission by the company despite knowing that it was calculated to defraud a creditor, employee or shareholder of the company, or had another fraudulent purpose.

A director of a company will, in addition, be held liable in terms of section 77(3) where that director:

- purports to bind the company or authorise the taking of any action by or on behalf of the company without the requisite authority;
- acts in the name of the company in a way that is false or misleading; or
- knowingly or recklessly signs or consents to the publication of a financial statement which is false or misleading in a material respect.

Sub-sections 77(3)(b) and (c) of the Companies Act state that any director of a company is liable for any loss, damages or costs sustained by the company as a direct or indirect consequence of the director:

- having acquiesced in the carrying on of the company's business despite knowing that it was being conducted in a manner prohibited by section 22(1) of the Companies Act; or
- being party to an act or omission by the company despite knowing that the act or omission was calculated to defraud a creditor, employee or shareholder of the company or had another fraudulent purpose.

In this context, it was held by the Appeal Court in *Howard v Herrigel* that "knowingly" means, and a potential litigant must be able to prove, that:

*"on a balance of probabilities, that the person sought to be held liable had knowledge of the facts from which the conclusion is properly to be drawn that the business of the company was or is being carried on [in any of such ways]. It would not be necessary to go further and prove that the person also had actual knowledge of the legal consequences of those facts."*

Section 22(1) of the Companies Act states that a company must not carry on its business recklessly, with gross negligence, with intent to defraud any person or for any fraudulent purpose. Therefore, if a company continues to incur debts, where, in the opinion of reasonable businessmen standing in the shoes of the directors, there would be no reasonable prospect of the creditors receiving payment when the company's debts fall due (i.e. commercial insolvency), it will in general be a proper inference that the company's business is being carried on recklessly or negligently as contemplated by section 22(1) of the Companies Act.

The test will always be that there will come a point in time when a reasonable businessmen would wind up the company, unless they have access to further capital which can revitalise the company with some appropriate form of capital reconstruction. The detail of financial information available to a director, together with the veracity of such information, will be taken into account when the personal liability of such director is examined in terms of section 77 of the Companies Act.

There have been several court decisions prior to the commencement of the Companies Act in which the meaning of "recklessly" has been interpreted. In these cases it was held that, "recklessly" must be given its ordinary meaning. It therefore does not mean mere negligence, but at the very least, gross negligence. Recklessness also consists of *"an entire failure to give consideration to the consequences of one's actions, in other words, an attitude of reckless disregard of such consequences."*

Importantly, in order to hold directors personally liable for the debts of a company, there must also be evidence of the company's inability to pay. The liability of a director is, in terms of section 77(6) of the Companies Act, joint and several with any other person who is or may be held liable for the same act (which means that a single director can be held liable for the totality of damages suffered by a third party as a result of the breach of fiduciary duties).

It is worth noting that in terms of section 77(7) of the Companies Act, proceedings to recover any loss, damages or costs for which a person is or may be held liable in terms of section 77 of the Companies Act may not be commenced more than three years after the act or omission that gave rise to that liability. Furthermore, in terms of section 78(2) of the Companies Act, any action taken that directly or indirectly purports to relieve a director of liability under section 77 is considered void.

## Personal liability of directors to third parties (such as creditors) under the Companies Act

Section 218(2) of the Companies Act requires a causal link between the offending conduct on the one hand and the loss suffered by the third party on the other hand, by providing that –

*“any person who contravenes any provision of this Act is liable to any other person for any loss or damage suffered by that person as a result of that contravention.”*

The Supreme Court of Appeal has interpreted the section narrowly and concluded that neither a shareholder (*Hlumisa Investment Holdings RF Ltd v Kirkinis* 2020 5 SA 419 (SCA)) nor a creditor (*Venator Africa (Pty) Limited v Bekker* 2024 (4) SA 539 (SCA)) can rely solely on section 218(2) of the Companies Act to hold directors personally liable for individual/personal losses. The reasoning of the Supreme Court of Appeal essentially turns on the technical fact that section 218 does not create a distinct cause of action where the Companies Act does not create a concomitant right. In this regard, liability in terms of section 77 is for costs, damages or losses suffered by the company, and that section does not give any rights to a shareholder or creditor to recover personal losses. Despite this, there is a presumption in our law that the legislature does not include any unnecessary or purposeless provisions, and it thus might be premature to disregard the risk for personal liability implied by section 218(2) entirely.

## Liability for reckless trading under section 424 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973

Section 424 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (“**1973 Act**”) provides that where the debtor company has been wound-up because it is unable to pay its debts, and a creditor is able to prove that the debtor company’s directors acted recklessly, the debtor company’s directors can be held personally liable for any debt/loss. In order for a director to be held liable under section 424 of the 1973 Act, it is not necessary to prove that the director’s reckless conduct caused the creditor’s particular loss.

## Delinquent and probationer directors – section 162 of the Companies Act

In addition to the above, our courts have declared directors, who have failed to discharge their duties under the Companies Act to be placed under probation or to be declared delinquent, and have granted leave to the companies involved to claim damages from such director for losses incurred as a result of such director’s conduct.

In terms of section 162 of the Companies Act, a company, a shareholder, a director, a company secretary or prescribed officer of the company, a registered trade union that represents employees of the company, or any other representative of the employees of the company, may apply to court for an order declaring a person delinquent or under probation if:

- the person is a director of that company, or within 24 months immediately preceding the application, was a director of that company; and
- amongst other things such director has:
  - whilst under a probation order in terms of the Companies Act or the Close Corporations Act, acted in a manner that contravened that order;
  - grossly abused the position of a director;
  - intentionally, or by gross negligence, inflicted harm upon the company or a subsidiary of the company, contrary to the provisions of the Companies Act;

- acted in any manner that amounts to gross negligence, wilful misconduct or breach of trust in relation to the performance of such director's duties.

Furthermore, the Companies Act provides that a director may be declared delinquent if he or she uses their position or any information obtained while acting in the capacity of a director to:

- gain an advantage for himself or herself or for another person other than the company or a wholly owned subsidiary of the company; or
- knowingly cause harm to the company or a subsidiary of the company.

Any organ of state responsible for the administration of any legislation may also apply to court for an order declaring a director delinquent, if such director has repeatedly been personally subjected to a compliance notice or similar enforcement mechanism for substantially similar conduct in terms of any legislation.

A court will be obligated to declare a person to be a delinquent director if the person consented to serve as a director while ineligible or disqualified.

Such disqualifications are set out in section 69 of the Companies Act and include that such person:

- was an unrehabilitated insolvent; or
- is prohibited in terms of any public regulation to be a director; or
- has been removed from an office of trust on the grounds of misconduct involving dishonesty; or
- has been convicted in the Republic or elsewhere for theft, fraud, forgery or any conduct involving fraud, misrepresentation or dishonesty or offences involving various statutes such as the Insolvency Act, the Close Corporation Act, the Competition Act, the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, the Financial Markets Act or the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act.

Any person who has at least twice been personally convicted of an offence or subjected to an administrative fine or similar penalty in terms of any legislation could also be subject to an application for a declaration of delinquency.

Any declaration of delinquency will subsist for the lifetime of the person declared delinquent on account of having consented to serve as a director whilst ineligible or disqualified under the Companies Act, or whilst under a probation order in terms of the Companies Act that person acted in a manner that contravened the probation order.

Any declaration made by the court may be made subject to any conditions that the court considers appropriate, including a limitation of the application of such a declaration to one or more particular categories of companies. Without limiting the powers of the court, a court may order as conditions applicable or ancillary to a declaration of delinquency or probation that the person concerned:

- undertakes a designated programme of remedial education relevant to the nature of the person's conduct as director;
- carries out a designated programme of community service; or
- pays compensation to any person adversely affected by the person's conduct as a director to the extent that such a victim does not otherwise have a legal basis to claim compensation.

The Companies Act further states that if any person was a director of more than one company (irrespective of whether concurrently, sequentially or at unrelated times) and where two or more of those companies each failed to pay all of their creditors or meet all of their obligations (except in terms of a business rescue plan resulting from a board resolution or a compromise with creditors in terms of the Companies Act), that person could be subject to a declaration of delinquency.

As an alternative to a declaration of delinquency, a court may make an order placing a person under probation instead. This would occur under circumstances where the court is satisfied that the declaration is justified, having regard to the circumstances of the company's conduct and the person's conduct in relation to the management, business or property of the company at the time. Such order for probation (similar to a suspended sentence) will be made subject to conditions that the court considers appropriate and may subsist for a period not exceeding five years.

It is important to note that an order for probation applies to directors who were present at meetings of companies and failed to vote against a resolution despite the inability of the company to satisfy the solvency and liquidity test as set out in section 4 of the Companies Act. The solvency and liquidity test would apply to directors and any person who is obligated to consider whether, having regard to the reasonably foreseeable financial circumstances of the company at a particular point in time that the assets of the company are fairly valued, are equal to or exceed the liabilities of the company, and it appears that the company will be able to pay its debts as they become due in the ordinary course of business for a period of 12 months thereafter.

Furthermore, any person may be placed under probation if he or she:

- acts in a manner materially inconsistent with the duties of a director; or
- acts in or supports a decision of a company to act in a manner which results in oppressive or prejudicial conduct; or
- on some basis acted in a manner which constituted an abuse of the separate juristic personality of such company.

If a person is placed under probation, he or she is to be supervised by a mentor in any future participation as a director while the order remains in force or be limited to serving as a director of a private company or of a company of which that person is the sole shareholder.

Any person who has been declared delinquent, or subject to an order of probation, may apply to court to suspend the order of delinquency and substitute it with an order of probation, with or without conditions, at any time more than three years after the order of delinquency was made, or to set aside an order of delinquency at any time more than two years after it was suspended, or an order of probation at any time after such order was made.

This will not be available to a person declared delinquent on account of having consented to serve as a director whilst ineligible or disqualified under the Companies Act or whilst under probation in terms of the Companies Act or the Close Corporations Act and acted in a manner that contravened that order.

One of the most publicised cases decided in terms of section 162 was *Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse and Another v Myeni and Others* ([2020] 3 All SA 578 (GP)). The court emphasised that the delinquency provisions are a strict protective measure aimed at safeguarding companies and the public from sustained, serious governance failures, and concluded that the director's conduct in the instance reflected "an alarming lack of appreciation for her fiduciary responsibilities as chair of the board of a major state owned company" and that her actions "were reckless, dishonest and grossly negligent and caused substantial harm ...." The court evaluated her behaviour primarily against the statutory duties in section 76 of the Companies Act and the heightened obligations under the Public Finance Management Act, but also situated those duties within SAA's own governance framework, which incorporated the corporate governance standards of the relevant King III Report (which then applied). Although the decisive basis for declaring Ms Myeni a delinquent director lay in the proven breaches of

her statutory and fiduciary duties, the King III Report informed the background understanding of what was expected of a responsible chairperson.

## Directors' duties when a company faces financial difficulties

Section 129(1) of the Companies Act provides that –

“the board of a company may resolve that the company voluntarily begin business rescue proceedings and place the company under supervision, if the board has reasonable grounds to believe that (a) the company is financially distressed; and (b) there appears to be a reasonable prospect of rescuing the company” (our emphasis)”

In terms of section 128(1)(f) of the Companies Act, the words “financially distressed” mean that:

- I. it appears to be reasonably unlikely that the company will be able to pay all of its debts as they become due and payable within the immediately ensuing six months; or
- II. it appears to be reasonably likely that the company will become insolvent within the immediately ensuing six months”.

Consequently, there are two instances in which a company may be held to be “financially distressed”.

In order to determine whether or not either instance has occurred, the following tests must be performed:

- a cash flow test, which pertains to so called “commercial insolvency” where a company cannot pay its debts as and when they fall due for payment (section 128(1)(f)(i)); or
- a balance sheet test, which relates to so called “factual or technical insolvency” where a company’s liabilities exceeds its assets (section 128(1)(f)(ii)).

In both instances, the word “reasonably” is used. Accordingly, the test for financial distress is objective; would a reasonable director, in the same position as the directors of the company, have come to the same conclusions regarding the company’s financial position, if that reasonable director had to make the same decision.

The Companies Act is silent on when the aforesaid test must be applied, or how it is to be decided that company is likely to become “financially distressed”. It is therefore recommended that the board of directors should, continuously monitor whether the company is able to pay its debts as they fall due and payable, or if the company is likely to become factually insolvent, in the ensuing six months.

In addition to the foregoing, section 129(7) of the Act provides that:

“[i]f the board of a company has reasonable grounds to believe that the company is financially distressed, but the board has not adopted a resolution contemplated in this section, the board must deliver a written notice to each affected person, setting out the criteria referred to in section 128(1)(f) that are applicable to the company, and its reasons for not adopting a resolution contemplated in this section” (our emphasis).

Accordingly, if the board of directors of the company concludes that the company is financially distressed at any particular point in time, it will be obliged to either (i) adopt a resolution in accordance with the provisions of section 129(1) of Companies Act to place the company under business rescue; or (ii) deliver a written notice to each affected person (in accordance with the provisions of section 129(7) of the Companies Act) advising why the requisite resolution was not adopted.

If the directors make a decision not to place a company under business rescue at a certain point in time on the basis that they do not believe that the company is financially distressed at that time, and if the financial position of the company changes at a later point in time, we are of the view that the directors are obliged to reconvene and reconsider the test for financial distress.

The decision to either place a company in business rescue, or to send out a section 129(7) notice should be carefully considered, particularly the latter, which may give rise to unintended consequences. Accordingly, it is imperative for directors to take appropriate advice when assessing whether a company is financially distressed and whether business rescue proceedings are appropriate in the circumstances.

It must also be noted that, in the specific circumstances contemplated under section 130(5)(c)(ii) of the Companies Act, an order to pay costs may be made by a court against any director who voted in favour of a resolution to commence business rescue, in circumstances where a court has found that there were no reasonable grounds for believing that the company would be unlikely to pay all of its debts as they became due and payable. Although these circumstances only arise in specific instances, and where an application is made to court in terms of section 130(1), the potential liability for costs reinforces the fact that directors ought to take appropriate advice when a company is experiencing financial distress, to ensure that correct decisions are taken.

It is also important to note that, in the event that a company is considered to be financially distressed and as a result, business rescue proceedings have commenced, the Companies Act, in section 142, imposes additional responsibilities on directors. In terms of section 142(1) and (2) of the Companies Act, each director must deliver to the business rescue practitioner, all books and records relating to the affairs of the company which are in such director's possession, or must inform the business rescue practitioner of the whereabouts, if known, of such books and records. Moreover, the directors must, in terms of section 142(3) of the Companies Act, provide the business rescue practitioner, within five business days after business rescue proceedings begin, with a statement of affairs of the company, containing, at a minimum, the particulars set out in section 142(3). Section 142 of the Companies Act therefore imposes further duties and liabilities on company directors.

## What are the defences available to directors to escape personal liability?

The Companies Act has adopted the business judgment rule, as section 76(4) of the Companies Act provides that a director will escape personal liability if that director:

- has taken reasonably diligent steps to become informed about the matter at hand;
- does not have a personal financial interest therein (or has declared such an interest to the board in terms of section 75 of the Companies Act); and
- has a rational basis to believe that the decision was in the best interest of the company at the time.

The first requirement for the application of the business judgment rule is that the decision must be an informed one, and in taking reasonably diligent steps in becoming so informed, directors are entitled to rely on information prepared by the employees of the company, accountants or any other professional person retained by the company.

The second requirement is self-explanatory, and insofar as the third requirement is concerned it must be noted that the test of rationality is objective. The belief must be one that a reasonable person in the position of the director would hold. An objectively irrational decision is not protected.

Also, in terms of section 77(9) of the Companies Act, in any proceedings against a director, other than for wilful misconduct or wilful breach of trust, the court may relieve the director, either wholly or partly, from any liability set out in section 77 of the Companies Act, on any terms the court considers just if:

- it appears to the court that the director has acted honestly and reasonably; or
- having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including those connected with the appointment of the director, it would be fair to excuse the director.

This is supplemented by section 77(10) of the Companies Act which enables a director, who has reason to apprehend that a claim may be made against him or her personally, to lodge an anticipatory application to a court for relief. Section 77(10), like section 77(9), does not apply to wilful misconduct or a wilful breach of trust. The intended effect of sections 76(4) and 77(9)-(10) of the Companies Act is to protect directors who, in carrying on the business of a company, have shown a genuine concern for its prosperity and have made decisions in its best interest. Directors should note that any inquiry into the conduct of the affairs of a company will always involve an evidential investigation.

To the extent that a director has fulfilled his or her fiduciary duties and conducted the affairs of the company in accordance with sound business practices that fall within the parameters of these expectations, the evidence should speak for itself. Compliance with what can be reasonably expected of a director when faced with similar circumstances will therefore constitute a defence to any action launched in terms of section 77 of the Companies Act. "Reasonable behaviour" will differ from case to case and will be considered having regard to the peculiar circumstances of the issues facing a particular director.

As in all cases involving negligence, the test in South African law is essentially an objective one, in that it postulates the standard of conduct of the notionally reasonable director. However, the test is subjective insofar as the notional director is seen as conducting himself or herself with the same knowledge and access to financial information as the relevant director would have had in the circumstances. In this regard, the court will consider, inter alia, the:

- scope of operations of the company;
- role, functions and powers of the directors;
- amount of the corporate debt;
- extent of the company's financial difficulties; and
- the prospect, if any, of recovery.

## Limitation of liability, indemnification and directors' insurance

Section 78(2) of the Companies Act provides that any provision of an agreement, the MOI or rules of a company, or a resolution adopted by a company, which directly or indirectly purports to relieve a director of any duty or liability, or negate, limit or restrict any legal consequences arising from an act or omission that constitutes wilful misconduct or wilful breach of trust on the part of the director, is void.

However (and except to the extent that the MOI of a company provides otherwise), a company may, in terms of section 78(5) of the Companies Act, indemnify a director in respect of any liability. This however does not apply to any liability arising:

- from wilful misconduct or wilful breach of trust on the part of the director; or
- where a fine has been imposed as a consequence of a director having been convicted of an offence; or
- where a director acted recklessly, or despite knowing he or she lacked authority, or with the intent to defraud creditors, or with any other fraudulent purpose.

In addition to the above, the company may, in terms of section 78(4) of the Companies Act and subject to its MOI:

- advance expenses to a director to defend litigation in any proceedings arising out of the director's service to the company; and
- directly or indirectly indemnify a director for the expenses incurred, or to be incurred, for such litigation if such litigation is abandoned, or which exculpates the director, or which arises in respect of any liability for which the company may indemnify the director, as described above.

Section 78(7) of the Companies Act provides further, that a company may (subject to its MOI) purchase insurance to protect:

- a director against liability or expenses for which it is permitted to indemnify a director; and
- the company against any liability for which the company is permitted to indemnify a director, or any contingency including any expenses it is permitted to advance in respect of the defending of litigation by a director, or to indemnify a director for such expenses.

## Lessons to be learnt

Directors will have to carefully consider the manner in which they conduct the affairs of companies.

There is no excuse for directors to argue (when faced with claims for personal liability) that they were uninformed or unsighted when it comes to them having knowledge of the relevant provisions of the Companies Act.

Directors must also proactively ensure and guard against falling foul of the provisions of the Companies Act, including those set out above. In addition, directors must consider whether they are trading recklessly when the company is experiencing financial distress, and whether to place the company into business rescue, liquidation, or neither. Failure to do so may result in their conduct being the subject of scrutiny either by a business rescue practitioner or, if the company is subsequently placed into liquidation, at insolvency inquiries in the post liquidation period.

In view of the law relating to delinquency set out above, directors must guard against finding themselves on the receiving end of such delinquency orders. It must be borne in mind that a director who is the subject of a delinquency order will not be nominated and, in fact, cannot be appointed to any other board of directors. It must be noted that the word "delinquency" also carries criminal connotations. The various dictionary definitions of the term "delinquency" refer to "offender", "guilty of a crime or misdeed", "failing in one's duties" or "failing to perform an obligation", with the most telling and damning being "a person guilty of serious antisocial or criminal conduct". In this regard, directors who are declared to be delinquent may also be held criminally liable under section 214 of the Companies Act.

These provisions, coupled with the corporate governance principles set out in the King V Report, must serve as a guide for boards of directors when managing the business and affairs of a company. This is increasingly important given that the courts have been prepared to draw on the best practices indicated by the King V Report (and its predecessors) to inform the standard of care, skill and diligence against which directors' conduct is measured. In general, directors should therefore undertake a frank and realistic review of the manner in which their companies operate. This is essential in avoiding personal liability.

Across the globe, directors' duties towards their companies are coming into increased focus, to ensure that correct decisions are made. This is all the more relevant, with shareholder activism on the increase. Failure to maintain the requisite level of knowledge on the issues dealt with in this booklet may result in directors being, at best, severely criticised or, at worst, being held personally and/or criminally liable for company debts as a result of reckless and negligent behaviour.

# Meet the authors





## Director and Head of Insolvency & Business Rescue

---

### Dr Eric Levenstein

Johannesburg

**T** +27 11 535 8237

**E** elevenstein@werksmans.com



## Senior Knowledge Lawyer

---

### Helena Stoop

Cape Town

**T** +27 21 405 5202

**E** hstoop@werksmans.com



## Senior Associate

---

### Brandon Starr

Johannesburg

**T** +27 11 535 8348

**E** bstarr@werksmans.com

Nothing in this publication should be construed as legal advice from any lawyer or this firm. Werksmans' legal articles and events should be seen as general summaries of developments or principles of interest that may not apply directly to specific circumstances. Professional advice should therefore be sought before any action is taken.

# About Us

---

Established in the early 1900s, Werksmans is a leading South African corporate and commercial law firm, serving multi-nationals, listed companies, financial institutions, entrepreneurs and government.

Operating in Gauteng and the Western Cape, the firm is connected to an extensive African legal alliance through LEX Africa. LEX Africa was established in 1993 as the first and largest African legal alliance and offers huge potential for our clients seeking to do business on the continent by providing a gateway to Africa.

The firm comprises a team of independent-minded professionals with a shared commitment to client service. With a formidable track record in mergers & acquisitions, banking & finance, insolvency & business rescue, commercial litigation and dispute resolution, Werksmans is distinguished by the calibre of our people, the clients we serve and the work that we attract.

Our success is built on a solid foundation of insightful legal advice, innovative deal structuring, a keen understanding of business and economic imperatives and an unwavering focus on achieving the best legal outcome for our clients.

## Contact Details

---

### Johannesburg

T +27 11 535 8000

### Cape Town

T +27 21 405 5100

### Stellenbosch

T +27 21 809 6000

» Keep us close